Wednesday, 18 December 2013, from 9.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. (9h00-17h30)
\nUniversit\u00e9 Paris-Dauphine
\nRoom Raymond ARON
\n2nd Floor<\/p>\n
The workshop was held in English.<\/p>\n
Presentation<\/strong> But conventional wisdom in electricity restructuring requires limitations of long term contracts and vertical integration between generators, retailers and large consumers, for allowing entries and development of effective competition on wholesale and retail markets. Attachment to these principles was particularly reflected in the competition principles of the European Commission and some regulation authorities. Economic theory of industrial organisation which formerly points restrictions of competition by CLTs affords new insights on the limitation of entries in generation. In fact it could appear easier if entrants could be helped by long term forward contracts, which would make market more contestable. Moreover some academic works suggest that antitrust regulators could consider introducing forward contracts as a means to reduce market power exercise on oligopolistic markets. So under some change in competition policy principles, future reforms of European electricity markets will therefore need to explore alternative models of competition allowing investment in the technology mix.<\/p>\n The workshop will deal with this need of long term contracts on which consensus is evolving. Market design issues as well as competition issues will be raised in theoretical way and above all particular in an empirical way by referring to concrete experiences.<\/p>\n PROGRAMME AND SLIDES<\/strong><\/p>\n 9.00 a.m. – 9.30 a.m.: Registration<\/p>\n 9.30 a.m. – 9.45 a.m.: Welcome of Participants and presentation of key issues by\u00a0Jan Horst KEPPLER, Scientific Director of the Chaire European Electricity Markets (CEEM)<\/strong> I. SESSION 1: 9.45 a.m. – 10.45 a.m. Chairman: Jan Horst KEPPLER, Scientific Director of the CEEM, Universit\u00e9 Paris-Dauphine.<\/strong><\/p>\n Presentation 1: Inge BERNAERTS, Head of Wholesale Markets Unit (DG Energy)<\/strong>, \u201cIn the line of the forthcoming Communication: How can we provide certainty to investors and stimulate investment in low carbon technologies?\u201d Presentation 2: David NEWBERY, EPRG, Cambridge University<\/strong>, \u201cContracting with government to invest in low carbon technologies: How to design the Visible Hand?\u201d 10.45 a.m. – 11.15 a.m. Coffee Break<\/p>\n II. SESSION 2: 11.15 a.m. – 12.45 a.m. Chairman: Patrice GEOFFRON, Director of CGEMP, Professor in Economics, Director of Axis 3 CEEM, Universit\u00e9 Paris-Dauphine.<\/strong><\/p>\n Presentation 1: Eric BROUSSEAU, Universit\u00e9 Paris-Dauphine<\/strong>, \u201cBetween the market and vertical integration: The transactional efficiency of long-term arrangements in liberalized capital intensive industries\u201d. Presentation 2: Dominique FINON, CEEM and CIRED<\/strong>, \u201cFrom the failure of long-term commercial contracting to public coordination under long-term contracting with a neutral agency\u201d. Presentation 3: Fabien ROQUES, Compass Lexecon and CEEM Associate<\/strong>, \u201cAuctioning of long-term contracts for electricity supply: Different approaches and options\u201d. Working paper<\/a><\/p>\n 12.45 a.m. – 2.00 p.m. Lunch<\/p>\n SESSION 2 (Continued): 2.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.<\/p>\n Presentation 4: Patricia VAN HORN FLORIN, CEEM-Universit\u00e9 Paris-Dauphine<\/strong>, \u201cLessons from LTCs experience in semi-liberalised markets: the case of Ontario and California\u201d. Presentation 5: Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric DE MANEVILLE, Former Director of Vattenfall France<\/strong>, \u201cThe competition for access to hydroelectric assets: risks related to specifications in current tendering procedures\u201d.<\/p>\n Presentation 6: Anne LAPIERRE, Partner, Norton Rose<\/strong>, \u201cTenders for off-shore wind-power: analysis of contractual risks\u201d. 3.10 p.m. -3.30 p.m. Coffee Break<\/p>\n III. SESSION 3: 3.30 p.m. – 4.30 p.m. Chairman: Dominique FINON, CEEM and CIRED.<\/strong><\/p>\n Presentation 1: Anna CRETI, Universit\u00e9 Dauphine<\/strong>, \u201cRecent theoretical developments on long-term contracts and imperfect competition\u201d.
\nDecarbonizing the European electricity industry while maintaining security of supply, will require significant investment in both clean generation technologies and fossil-fuel peak equipment. But the theory for electricity market liberalization developed in the early 1980s is rooted on marginal cost pricing, a market paradigm which worked well to induce competition between technologies with significant variables costs, such as gas fired plants. It does not help to secure investment in large CAPEX equipment as they are in the whole set of RES-E and low carbon technologies. Long-term contracts and vertical integration are the most convenient way to maintain incentives to invest in all the technology mix by helping risk management and risk sharing.<\/p>\n
\nIntroduction<\/a><\/p>\n
\nTHE DILEMMA OF LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS FOR DECARBONISATION POLICIES IN EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKETS<\/strong><\/p>\n
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\nLONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PRODUCERS, SUPPLIERS AND PUBLIC AGENCIES<\/strong><\/p>\n
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\nLONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND COMPETTION ELECTRICITY MARKETS<\/strong><\/p>\n
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