{"id":1288,"date":"2017-06-05T09:30:25","date_gmt":"2017-06-05T07:30:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/?p=1288"},"modified":"2024-09-05T09:32:36","modified_gmt":"2024-09-05T07:32:36","slug":"rationales-for-capacity-remuneration-mechanisms-security-of-supply-externalities-and-asymmetric-investment-incentives","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/rationales-for-capacity-remuneration-mechanisms-security-of-supply-externalities-and-asymmetric-investment-incentives\/","title":{"rendered":"Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) in<br \/>\nderegulated electricity markets. Ubiquitous in real-world electricity markets, CRMs are introduced country<br \/>\nby country in an ad hoc manner, lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling<br \/>\ncomparability and coordination. They are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a theoretical<br \/>\nbenchmark model that argues that competitive energy-only markets with VOLL pricing provide adequate<br \/>\nlevels of capacity. While the benchmark model is a consistent starting point for discussions about electricity<br \/>\nmarket design, it ignores the two market failures that make CRMs the practically appropriate and theoretically<br \/>\njustified policy response to capacity issues. First, energy-only markets fail to internalize security-of-supply<br \/>\nexternalities as involuntary curbs on demand under scarcity pricing generate social costs beyond the private<br \/>\nnon-consumption of electricity. Second, when demand is inelastic and the potential capacity additions are<br \/>\ndiscretely sized, investors face asymmetric incentives and will underinvest at the margin rather than overinvest.<br \/>\nAfter presenting the key features of the theoretical benchmark model, this paper conceptualizes security of<br \/>\nsupply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives and concludes with some consideration regarding<br \/>\ndesign of CRMs.<\/p>\n<p>Energy Policy 105 (2017)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) in deregulated electricity markets. Ubiquitous in real-world electricity markets, CRMs are introduced country by country in an ad hoc manner, lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling comparability and coordination. They are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1288","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-publications-en","category-journal-articles"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1288","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1288"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1288\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1292,"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1288\/revisions\/1292"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1288"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1288"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ceem-dauphine.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1288"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}